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Recently there have been several studies that examined monetary policy under model uncertainty. These
studies formulated uncertainty in a number of different ways. One of the prominent ways to formulate
model uncertainty is to form a non-parametric set of perturbations around some nominal model where the
set is structured so that the uncertainty is focused on potentially important weaknesses of the model.
Unfortunately, previous efforts were unable to compute exact optimal policy rules under this general
formulation of uncertainty. Moreover, for those special cases when the robust rules were computed, the
degree of their aggressiveness was often counterintuitive in light of conventional Brainard/Bayesian
wisdom that policy under uncertainty should be conservative. This paper,therefore, consists of three
different exercises concerning minimax analysis of policy rules under model uncertainty. First, the
minimax approach is compared with the Bayesian one in a stylized Brainard (1967) setting. Strong
similarities between recommendations of the two approaches are found. Next, a more realistic setting such
as in Onatski and Stock (1999) is considered. A characterization of the worst possible models
corresponding to the max part of the minimax scheme is given. It is shown that the worst possible models
for very aggressive rules, such as the H-infinity rule, have realistic economic structure whereas those for
passive rules, such as the actual Fed’s policy, are not plausible. Thus, the results of minimax analysis
presented in Onatski and Stock (1999) might be biased against the passive rules. Finally, exact optimal
minimax policy rules for the case of slowly time-varying uncertainty in the case of the Rudebusch and
Svensson’s (1998) model are computed. The optimal rule under certainty turns out to be robust to moderate
deviations from Rudebusch and Svensson’s model.2 .1 Introduction
.1 Introduction
The question of robustness of monetary policy rules to model uncertainty has recently re-
ceivedmuchattention,bothfrompractitionersandacademicresearchers. Uncertaintyabout
the workings of the economy in the new European environment, steady decline of the nat-
ural unemployment rate in the USA, and the recent Asian crisis have all contributed to this
interest. Alan Blinder (1998) outlined one approach to deal with model uncertainty. Speak-
ing from the perspective of a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, he suggested choosing a set of models that might be good approximations of real-
ity, ‘‘... simulate a policy on as many of these models as possible, throw out the outlier(s),
and average the rest...’’ The recently proposed minimax approach seems to recommend do-
ing exactly the opposite. Keep outliers and make sure a policy works reasonably well in the
worst possible case.
This paper looks closely at the minimax approach and tries to answer several ques-
tions. First, how do policy recommendations based on minimax differ from those sounded
on the Bayesian approach? Do the minimax recommendations make sense in a simple
Brainard (1967) setting for policy analysis? Second, what are the outlier models the min-
imax approach takes care of? Particularly, do these outliers have any economic meaning
for the minimax analysis performed by Onatski and Stock (1999)? Finally, is computation
of the optimal minimax policy feasible for general model uncertainty? If yes, what are the
minimax policy recommendations?
Thepaperconsistsofthreeexercisescorrespondingtotheabovethreegroupsofques-
tions. First, Iconsiderastaticpolicyenvironmentwithonlyonepolicytargetandonepolicy.1 Introduction 3
instrument. As Brainard’s Bayesian analysis showed, uncertainty about model parameters
leads to more conservative policy rules in this simple setting. I found that the optimal min-
imax policy also becomes less aggressive as the uncertainty rises. However, dissimilar to
Bayesian case, there exist two regimes of the optimal rule’s reaction to the amount of uncer-
tainty. When the uncertainty is small the rule stays equal to the certainty equivalence rule,
after certain threshold the minimax policy becomes more and more passive.
1
The second exercise considers the framework for minimax analysis of model uncer-
tainty proposed by Onatski and Stock (1999). Rudebusch and Svensson’s (1998) two-
equation macroeconometric model of the US economy is used as a core around which a
non-parametric set of plausible models is built. Attention is restricted to the sets of models
that could be obtained from the core by changing its parameters and/or adding arbitrarily
many more lags of inflation, output gap, and real interest rate to the dynamic Phillips curve
and aggregate demand equations that constitute the core model. The cumulative changes
made are required to be small. Only 2-parameter policy rules of the Taylor type are consid-
ered. According to these rules, the nominal interest rate is set to be a linear combination of
inflation and the output gap.
I analyzed particularly bad deviations from the Rudebusch-Svensson model that lead
to instability of one of the policy maker’s variables of interest: inflation, output gap, or
changes in the nominal interest rate. I found that the worst possible lag structure of the
deviations is exponentially decaying and showed how to calculate the rate of decay. My
￿ As is well known, for more general settings than that of Brainard, optimal Bayesian rules as well
as optimal minimax rules need not to be less aggressive than the optimal certainty rule. See, for
example, Chaw (1975), Sargent (1998), Stock (1998).4 .1 Introduction
calculations show that the decay is implausibly slow for relatively passive policy rules and
reasonably fast for relatively aggressive policy rules. The economy’s worst possible im-
pulse responses for the aggressive (passive) rules look as periodic fluctuations with ever
increasing amplitude and period of about 5 (40) year. These findings indicate that the re-
sults of minimax analysis presented in Onatski and Stock (1999) might be biased against
the passive rules.
Finally,thethirdexercisecalculatesexactoptimalminimaxrulesforthecaseofslowly
time varying uncertainty about Rudebusch and Svensson’s model. The rule suggests more
aggressive response to the output gap and less aggressive response to inflation than the
certainty rule does. The conventional linear quadratic optimal rule reported by Rudebusch
and Svensson demonstrates a moderate degree of robustness to model uncertainty.
Summing up, the analysis allows me to conclude that, first, the minimax approach,
though very different methodologically from the Bayesian approach, could lead to similar
policy recommendations. Second, the worst possible cases that minimax takes care of often
make good economic sense. However, in Onatski and Stock (1999) setting, the worst mod-
els for passive policy rules have unrealistically long memory. Third, calculation of exact
optimalminimaxpolicy rules isfeasibleforaslowlytimevaryinguncertainty specification.
The optimal certainty rule forRudebusch and Svensson’s model is moderately robust to this
form of uncertainty. Aggressive policy rules, though robust to uncertainty about the struc-
ture of the noise process and about parametric model uncertainty,
2 are not robust against lag
structure uncertainty and might lead to frequent and increasing business cycles.
2 See Sargent (1998), Stock (1998).2 Comparison of minimax and Bayesian policy implications 5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes optimal mini-
max policy rules in a simple Brainard (1967) setting. Section 3 describes the worst possible
deviations from the Rudebusch-Svensson model. In section 4, I compute exact minimax
optimal rules for lag structure uncertainty about the core model. Section 5 concludes.
.2 Comparison of minimax and Bayesian policy implications
Theminimaxapproachtopolicy analysisunderuncertaintyismethodologicallyvery differ-
ent from the Bayesian approach. The latter treats uncertainty as stochastic indeterminance
summarized in a prior distribution. It recommends a policy rule that minimizes expected
posterior risk. The minimax approach treats uncertainty as ignorance. It assumes that a
policy maker faces a whole set of possible alternatives and minimizes a loss, assuming the
worst possible realization from the set. In the Bayesian case, the size of uncertainty is as-
sociated with such characteristics of the prior distribution as its standard deviation. In the
minimax case, it is associated with the diameter of the set of possible alternatives.
The difference between the two approaches suggests that their policy recommenda-
tions may differ substantially. This section compares the recommendations in a simple
Brainard setting. Somewhat surprisingly, it finds a similarity between optimal minimax
and Bayesian policy rules.
I consider here the case of one target and one instrument, to make the analysis as
simple and transparent as possible. Assume that a variable of the policy maker’s interest,
tc is equal to @ n ,w h e r e is a policy variable,  is an exogenous variable, and @ is a
multiplier determining the degree to which policy affects the target variable. Let the policy6 .2 Comparison of minimax and Bayesian policy implications
maker’s utility function be Et t W2c where t W is some desired level of tIn a world of
certainty, the optimal policy would be

W 'E t
W  *@ (.1)
The policy maker may, however, face uncertainty about the model. This uncertainty
may come from two sources. On the one hand, the policy maker may be uncertain about
effect of the exogenous variable, c on t . On the other hand she might be uncertain about
the value of the coefficient @. This uncertainty may be modeled by assuming that @ and/or
 are random variables. If only  is uncertain, then the policy maker is in a situation of
certainty equivalence. To formulate the optimal policy, she could consider  as being equal
to its expectation and proceed as in the certainty case. The optimal policy will be:

W 'E t
W  7 *@c (.2)
where 7  is the mean value of .
As Brainard showed in his paper, in the case when @ is uncertain, a less aggressive
policy is optimal. More precisely, if @ and  are random variables with variances j2
@cj2
￿c
means 7 @c 7 c and coefficient of correlation, 4c then the following rule is optimal:

W '
7 @Et W  7   4j@j￿
7 @2 n j2
@
 (.3)
In the simplest case when 4 'fthe formula becomes:

W '
7 @Et W  7 
7 @2 n j2
@
 (.4)
One can see that the optimal policy under uncertainty (.4) is, indeed, less aggressive
than the optimal policy under certainty equivalence (.2). The reason behind this ’’cautious-.2 Comparison of minimax and Bayesian policy implications 7
ness’’ is simple. The expected squared error, Et t W2c that one would like to minimize,
consists of two parts. One part is the squared deviation of the average of t from the target
t Wc and the other part is the variance oftThe policy that makes the former part minimal is
the optimal policy under certainty equivalence. The latter part of the expected error is made
minimal by a zero policy. The optimal policy is in between, with the precise position de-
pending on the relative importance of the two parts of the expected squared error captured
by the coefficient of variation, j@*7 @c of @
In the minimax setting, uncertainty about @ and  is modeled differently. The policy





correlation 4c in the sense that they define a degree of ‘‘dispersion’’ and ‘‘interdependence’’
ofpossiblevaluesof@and . Thepositionofthesetgivesinformationabout@andsimilar
to what one gets from the mean values 7 @ and 7 
4
For example, on the one hand, we can model uncertainty about @ and  by saying
that @ and  are independent uniformly distributed random variables with means 7 @c 7 c and
variances j2
@cj 2
￿( on the other hand, we can similarly say that @ and areunknown numbers
from the support of the above distributions, that is from intervals
l@ 'd 7 @  B@c7 @ n B@o @?_ l￿ 'd 7   B￿c 7  n B￿oc (.5)
￿ Such uncertainty is called Knightian uncertainty.
e In principle, if x plays the role of noise in the model and one has good reasons to believe that
it should be modeled as a random variable, then it is possible to stay with this assumption in the





j￿. The minimax problem that the policy maker faces is to





E@ n   t
W
2 (.6)
In the following, I first find the minimax optimal policy for this particular specification of
uncertainty. After that, I will formulate a result for a more general specification of l
Let us, first, consider the case when only  is unknown. The squared error subject to
minimax analysis is a quadratic convex function of ( therefore it attains its maximum in
one of the extreme points of l￿ We can rewrite the minimax problem as follows:
4?
￿
4@ iE@ n7  n B￿  t
W















A policy,  'E t W7 *@c minimizes both the first and the third terms of the above expres-
sion, therefore, it is optimal. Note that this optimal policy has the same form as the optimal
policy (.2) in the situation of certainty equivalence in the previous section: minimax and
certainty equivalent strategies are therefore the same in the case of additive uncertainty.
Consider now the case when both @ and  are uncertain. As before, note that the
squared error, subject to minimax, is a quadratic convex function of  and of @ Therefore
the minimum must be attained in one of the four points: E7 @ 	 B@c 7  	 B￿ Consider the
situation when t W 	 7  and B@ 	 m7 @m
Figure 1 shows the space of variables @ and  The line @ n  t W 'frepresents
the set of points, @ and c for which the squared error is equal to zero. For any point, @￿c ￿c.2 Comparison of minimax and Bayesian policy implications 9
the corresponding square error is equal to the square of the vertical distance from the point
to the line. When  changes, the line rotates around point EfctW To solve the minimax
p r o b l e m ,w en e e dt of i n da such that the maximum of vertical distances from the points
E7 @ 	 B@c 7  	 B￿ to the line is minimal.
Forthesituationunderconsiderationwhen ispositiveandlarge,theworstthatcould
happen is a considerable overshooting of the target t W Accordingly, the maximally ‘‘dis-
tant’’ point is E7 @ n B@c 7  n B￿ When  decreases, the maximal distance start to decrease.
When crosseszero,the‘‘maximallydistant’’attributeswitchestothepointE7 @  B@c 7  n B￿
Indeed, as policy becomes negative, considerable overshooting will happen, if the policy
multiplier is small and  is big.
The maximal distance is minimum for the line depicted in the figure. This happens
when the vertical distance from the point E7 @  B@c 7  n B￿ becomes equal to the vertical
distance from the point E7 @ n B@c 7   B￿ The overshooting and undershooting situations
are balanced so that E7 @  B@ n7  n B￿  t W ' E7 @ n B@  7  n B￿ n t Wc that is the
optimal  is equal to Et W7 *7 @. One can see that theoptimal minimax policy rule is equal
to the certainty rule for the uncertainty specification under consideration and when t W 	 7 
and B@ 	 m7 @m
More generally, let l consists of all points E@c such that
j
2
￿E@  7 @
2  24j￿j@E@  7 @E  7 nj
2







This set is an ellipse with the center in E7 @c 7 c such that the ‘‘dispersions’’ of possible @ and
 are proportional to j2
@ and j2
￿c respectively, and the ‘‘interdependence’’ of possible @ and
 is regulated by a coefficient 4 Of course, l would have been just a confidence ellipse10 .2 Comparison of minimax and Bayesian policy implications
had @ and  been normally distributed with variances, j2
@ and j2
￿c and correlation, 4 This
choice of l is natural and intuitive and might well summarize scarce knowledge about @
and  that a policy maker might possess. The following proposition is true.
Proposition 1. If the size of uncertainty, oc is less than E n &7 @2*j2






7 @  4
2
c then the optimal minimax policy is:
 '
Et W  7 
7 @
 (.8)
Otherwise, if 4 is less (greater) than j@
j￿
E7 ￿3t W￿









@o  7 @2
$
 (.9)
The proof of the proposition is along the lines described above and is omitted.
Figure 2 plots optimal Bayesian (dashed line) and optimal minimaxrules for different
sizes of uncertainty, o To calculate Bayesian rules, I assume that @ and  are distributed
uniformly inside ellipse (.7).
5
Note that (.7) implies that the sign of the policy effect, @c is unambiguous if and only
if the size of uncertainty, oc is less than 7 @2*j2
@ The parameter, &c in the proposition is al-
ways positive. Therefore, if there is no uncertainty about the sign of the policy effect, then
the minimax approach recommends using the certainty equivalent rule. This recommenda-
tion corresponds to the flat portion of the minimax policy lines at figure 2. If uncertainty
becomes larger than certain threshold, P becomes less and less aggressive as r rises.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is as follows. The optimal minimax policy tries to
balance between two equally bad cases. One of the bad scenarios is overshooting the target
D Three cases are considered:  @3 =8>@3 > and  @ 3=8= The rest of the parameters for all of
the cases are: t ￿37 ￿
7 @ @ jd
jx @ jd
7 @ @4 =.2 Comparison of minimax and Bayesian policy implications 11
t Wc the other is undershooting t W. When uncertainty is relatively small, a deviation from
thecertainty equivalencepolicy improves oneofthebad cases but worsens theother, so one
should stay at the certainty equivalence. However, when the sign of the policy multiplier
becomes uncertain there is room for improvement in both cases.
Indeed, consider the situation when the gap, t W  7 c is positive and 4 'f  The two
worst possible cases are: very large @ and  on the one hand and very small @ and  on the
other hand. When the sign of @ becomes uncertain, it might become negative in the latter
bad case. Therefore, reducing  will improve not only the overshooting case but also the
undershooting one.
In case when 4 9'fthe implications of formula (.9) are parallel to those of formula
(.3) for the optimal Bayesian rule. For example, similar to Brainard’s (1967) findings, if the
gap t W  7  is positive and 4 becomes positive, then it pays for a policy maker to use a less
active policy  If 4 is sufficiently positive, the policy maker might even ‘‘go in the wrong
direction’’ making policy  negative, which is the same result as in Brainard (1967). Such
a situation is illustrated by the upper graph of figure 2. In the limit, when uncertainty about
@ and  goes to infinity, the optimal minimax policy becomes equal to the optimal Bayesian
policy.
To summarize, the minimax policy recommendations turn out to be similar to the
Bayesian recommendations in the simple setting considered above. The important differ-
encebetweentheminimaxoptimalpolicyandtheBayesianoneisthattheformerstaysequal
to the certainty equivalent rule if there is no uncertainty about the sign of the policy multi-12 .3 The worst possible cases
plier, @ Only after the uncertainty becomes large enough, the minimax policy rules become
less active and equal to Bayesian rules in the limit when uncertainty goes to infinity.
.3 The worst possible cases
The rest of the paper is concerned with minimax analysis of policy rules in the framework
described by Onatski and Stock (1999). It is assumed that a policy-maker views a model,
fc as a core or nominal model of the economy. She believes, however, that the model
is only an approximation to a truer model. She considers a non-parametric set of models,
i{jcas a set of possible alternatives tofModelsofthissetareindexedbytheoperator,
{ 5 (c corresponding to the difference in dynamics described by { and f The goal
of the policy-maker is to choose a rule, c from a set, ijc that minimizes expected loss






In this paper, I consider the Rudebusch-Svensson (1998) model to be the nominal




















where + stands for the gap between output and potential output, Z is inflation, and  is
the federal funds rate. All the variables are quarterly, measured in percentage points at an.3 The worst possible cases 13
annual rate and demeaned prior to estimation, so there are no constants in the equations.
Variables Z and  stand for four-quarter moving averages of inflation and federal funds rate,
respectively. The coefficients on lagged inflation in the first equation sum to one, so the
long run Phillips curve is assumed to be vertical.
It is assumed that a policy-maker can control the federal funds rate using a simple
Taylor-type rule:
| ' }ZZ| n }++|





| n *2E|  |3￿
2c
so the risk - is equal to T@ oEZ|nT@ oE+|n*2T@ oE||3￿ where expectation is taken
over the shocks 0 and # uncertainty.
Let u denote the lag operator and Eu denote a lag polynomial. Then the nominal
model could be rewritten in the following form:
Z|n￿ ' ZZEuZ| n Z+Eu+| n 0|n￿c
+|n￿ ' ++Eu+|  +oEuE|  Z|n#|n￿
It is reasonable to believe that the dynamic links between past inflation and the output gap
on the one hand and present inflation and output gap on the other are undermodeled. This
might be the case because some important variables, such as, for example, the exchange
rate, are omitted, or not all relevant lags are included, to mention only the most obvious
reasons. One could, therefore, believe that a truer model has a form,
Z|n￿ 'E ZZEun{ ZZZ| nE Z+Eun{ Z++| n 0|n￿c (.11)14 .3 The worst possible cases
+|n￿ 'E ++Eun{ +++|  E+oEun{ +oE|  Z|n#|n￿c (.12)
where {￿￿ are some causal dynamic operators.
Equations (.11, .12) constitute a perturbed model, {c indexed by a perturbation, {c
from the set
(o ' i{G{'_@}i{￿￿*4￿￿jcn{nojc
so that the perturbations of each particular channel, {￿￿c have norms, less than o4￿￿ If the
policy-maker believes that the nominal model is a good approximation to the truth, then the
size, oc of the perturbation { could be chosen to be small. The scaling factors, 4￿￿, regulate
relative importance of the individual channel perturbations, {￿￿c and will be ignored in the
following for simplicity of notations.
The operators from the set, (oc can be quite broadly defined, ranging from constant
operators (multiplication by a constant diagonal matrix) to linear time invariant operators
(that could be represented by a diagonal matrix of infinite u polynomials) or even to non-
linear time-varying operators. In this section of the paper, I restrict attention to linear
time invariant perturbations, {Eu. The norm n{n i st a k e nt ob et h eM" norm, that is
n{n ' tT￿5￿$￿ jE{E5c where j is the largest singular value of the matrix {E5 In the
case under consideration, {E5 is a diagonal matrix so the largest singular value is equal to
4@ ￿￿ tT￿5￿$￿ m{￿￿E5m
Computationoftheexactminimaxoptimalrules,csatisfying(.10)willbeconsidered
in the next section. Here I will concentrate on the analysis of particularly bad deviations,
{c that destabilize the economy for a given policy rule, .3 The worst possible cases 15
Suppose that a policy rule, c stabilizes all models, {c such that { 5 (ofc but for
any o:o fc there exists a {o 5 (oc such that the model, {oc is unstable under  Let us
call the number, ofc the radius of affordable perturbations for the rule  Stability of { is
equivalent to the condition that the characteristic roots of the model’s MA representation,
{Eu, lie inside the unit circle. If the core model is stable then all roots of fEu lie
inside the circle. When n{n starts to rize the roots might come closer and closer to the
boundary until one of them hits the unit circle at some point e￿/f when {'{ of In fact,
because{Eumusthaverealcoefficients,apairofcomplexconjugatedrootshitthecircle
simultaneously at e￿/f and e3￿/fc where /f 5 dfcZ
A method of finding radii of affordable perturbations was outlined in Onatski and
Stock (1999) where such radii were found for Taylor-type rules. Those interested in details
can find them in the above mentioned paper and references therein. A byproduct of the
method is the destabilizing frequency, /fc and the value of {ofE5 at 5 ' e￿/fc {ofEe￿/f'
_@}io￿￿e￿/￿￿j
6 Note that o￿￿  ofc because the M" norm of {of must be equal to of
Figure 3 summarizes Onatski and Stock’s findings. One can see that the highest radii
of affordable perturbations are associated with policy rules with small reaction to inflation
and medium reaction to output gap. The star at the picture denotes a policy rule with }Z '
D and }+ 'f D that was proposed by Taylor as a rule approximating the Fed’s rule well.
The square denotes a policy rule that is optimal when there is no uncertainty about the
Rudebusch-Svensson model.
S Strictly speaking, the method only allows to find upper and lower bounds on the radius that turn
out to be very close each to other for the problem at hand. The destabilizing frequency corresponds
to the upper bound for the radius.16 .3 The worst possible cases
In the rest of this section of the paper I would like to utilize the knowledge of the
destabilizing frequency and the ‘‘value’’ of the perturbation at this frequency to find the
destabilizing perturbation itself. It is especially interesting to know if the corresponding
perturbed model, which is the worst possible model for a given policy rule, has any eco-
nomic sense.
Formally, I am looking for causal time invariant operators, {￿￿c having a representa-
tion in the form of infinite L polynomials with real coefficients and such that n{￿￿nofc
and {￿￿Ee￿/f'o￿￿e￿/￿￿
It is easy to build such operators. Assume first that /￿￿ 5 dfcZc and consider opera-





where %￿￿ 5 Ec. Clearly, {￿￿E5 is an analytic function inside the unit circle with
absolute value o￿￿ on the circle. Thus, n{￿￿n ' o￿￿  ofWhen %￿￿ goes from  to ,t h e
value of {￿￿E5 at e￿/f goes from o￿￿ to o￿￿ counterclockwise along the circle with radius
o￿￿ Define %￿￿ as
%￿￿ '
e￿/f  e￿/￿￿
  e￿/fe￿/￿￿ 
It is not difficult to see that %￿￿ are indeed between  and c and that {￿￿Ee￿/f'o￿￿e￿/￿￿.
If /￿￿ 5 EZcf then the sign of the right hand side in (.13) must be changed to ’’–’’




In both cases, the worst possible perturbations, {c have ARMA(1,1) form and, there-
fore, exponentially decaying lag structure. An immediate implication of this result is that.3 The worst possible cases 17
unreasonable perturbations that emphasize the importance of, say, the one thousandth lag in
the model equations are not the worst. The worst possible operator (.13) can be expressed
in the form of an infinite L polynomial as follows:
{￿￿Eu'o￿￿

%￿￿ nE  %
2
￿￿u nE  %
2
￿￿%￿￿u








One can see that the rate of decay in the lag structure of {￿￿ is determined by %￿￿ Small by
absolute value %￿￿ implies short memory whereas m%￿￿m close to one indicates long memory.
The size of the lag coefficients in (.14) is small for both extremes, m%￿￿m$c% ￿￿ $ f
I computed the worst possible {￿￿ for the policy rules with }Z 5 d2Dc.o (grid of
0.25), and }+ 5 df2DceDo (grid of 0.125). The rates of decay, %￿￿c and position of /￿￿ vary
substantially in the chosen range of policies. However, it is possible to distinguish between
two groups of policy rules.
First, for relatively ‘‘passive’’ rules, very roughly, the rules with }Z 	 c} + 	 2c the
values of all individual channel perturbations {￿￿ at destabilizing frequency, {￿￿Ee￿/f'
o￿￿e￿/￿￿clieintheupperhalfofthecomplexplane. Thatis/￿￿ 5 dfcZand, therefore, all {￿￿
aregivenby(.13). Parameters%￿￿ turnouttobepositivenumberscloseto1. Informally, this
means that the memory of the economy in the worst case is very long for these ‘‘passive’’
rules. Formula (.14) together with equations (.11,.12) imply that the perturbed economy’s
reaction to key economic variables relative to the core economy is higher in total, but more
’’spread out’’ through time so that the immediate reaction of the economy is smaller.
Second,forpolicyruleswithveryactiveresponsetotheoutputgap,}+ : 2cthevalues
of all {￿￿,e x c e p t{+oc at the destabilizing frequencies lie in the lower part of the complex
plane. Therefore, {ZZc{Z+c and {++ are given by (.13) with sign of the right hand side18 .3 The worst possible cases
changed to ‘‘–’’. Values of %￿￿ are positive and quite low (lower than 0.7) for those rules
with relatively low response to inflation, but, as response to inflation rises, these values
become larger. For the rules with very active response to inflation, %￿￿ become close to 1.
One can see from (.11,.12) and (.14) (with sign of the right hand side changed to ‘‘–’’) that
the immediate reaction of the perturbed economy to changes in inflation and the output gap
is greater than inthenominalmodel, whereas thetotal reactionof theeconomy is lower: the
economy overshoots its long run response. Such a situation is dangerous for active rules
because under these rules, the economy starts to swing from expansion to recession and
back to expansion.
In what follows I restrict attention to two particularly interesting rules representing
the groups of policy rules described above. The ‘‘passive’’ rules are represented by Tay-
lor rule, }Z ' Dc} + 'f D The ‘‘active’’ rules are represented by the optimal M" rule,
}Z 'S e2c} + '2 .D The optimal M" rule is an interesting rule to analyze because it is an
extreme case among very aggressive rules shown to be robust to different kinds of uncer-
tainty. Sargent(1998)showedthataggressiverulesarerobusttouncertaintyaboutthenature
of shock process. Stock (1998) showed that such rules are robust to uncertainty about slope
of the Phillips curve and the output reaction to real interest rate in the Rudebusch-Svensson
model.
The parameters %￿￿ of the worst possible perturbations, {￿￿c for Taylor rule and the
optimal M" rule are given in the table below.
%ZZ %Z+ %+o %++
Taylor rule 0.91 0.93 0.97 0.71
Optimal M" rule 0.96 0.97 0.71 0.92.3 The worst possible cases 19
One can see that both worst possible perturbations are characterized by very long memory.
Thus, if one excludes long memory perturbations from the set of plausible ones, the radii
of affordable perturbations for the two rules might become much higher. In such a case the
rules might start to look much more robust. This conjecture turns out to be false for the
optimal M" rule but might be true for Taylor rule.
To see this, let truncated worst possible perturbations, 7 {￿￿c corresponding to a rule
 be obtained from {￿￿ by keeping only first three terms in (.14). The truncated worst
possibleperturbationsarenolongerdestabilizetheeconomy. However, theystilldestabilize
the economy when scaled by a number greater than 1. If the norm of the so scaled 7 {￿￿ is
only marginally higher than the radius of affordable perturbations for  then the exclusion
of the long memory perturbations from the set of plausible ones does not affect the radius
much.
Icomputedthenormsofthetruncatedworstpossibleperturbations forTaylorruleand
the optimal M" rule.
7 For Taylor rule, the norm is 1.45 that is substantially higher than the
corresponding radius of affordable deviations, 1.01. On the contrary, for the optimal M"
rule, the norm is 0.95 that is only marginally higher than the radius, 0.91.
Figures 4 and 5 show the impulse responses of inflation and the output gap for Taylor
rule and the optimal M" rule respectively. The solid line represents the impulse responses
in the case of nominal model. The dashed line represents the impulse responses for the
‘‘truncated’’perturbedmodel. Thefluctuationscausedbyimpulseshocksinthe‘‘truncated’’
. I did not truncate ++ f o rT a y l o rr u l ea n d+o for K" rule because for {￿￿ @3 =:4 half decay of
the corresponding polynomial’s coefficients happens after three quarters, which is rather fast.20 .4 Optimal minimax rules
worstpossibleeconomyregulatedbyTaylorrulehaveverylongperiod, about40years. The
corresponding fluctuations for the optimal M" rule have period of only 5 years.
To summarize, the analysis of the worst possible cases shows that the corresponding
worst possible perturbations have exponentially decaying lag structure. Furthermore, the
analysis suggests that the policy rules could be roughly divided into two groups, ‘‘passive’’
and ‘‘active’’ rules. The worst possible economies regulated by the ‘‘active’’ rules could be
characterized by larger than estimated immediate response to inflation and the output gap
which is reversed later, so that the economy swings into frequent ever increasing business
cycles. On the contrary, the worst possible perturbations for ‘‘passive’’ rules are charac-
terized by less than estimated immediate response of the economy to the key variables.
However, this response is substantially ‘‘spread out’’ through time, so that the perturbed
economy has unrealistically long memory resulting in very long destabilizing cycles.
.4 Optimal minimax rules
In this section I return to the minimax problem (.10). For each policy, c and each size of




A rule that provides the minimum of this maximum is the optimal minimax rule for the
uncertainty represented by (o
There exist technical difficulties that do not permit a solution to (.10) in its exact
form. The situation is, roughly, that the stochastic definition of shocks does not fit well in.4 Optimal minimax rules 21
the minimax methodology. It is, however, possible to reformulate (.10) in a way convenient
for minimax analysis. This requires modeling shock sequences not as realizations of a
white noise process but as points in some set that provides tight characterization of such
realizations. Below, I first describe such a characterization, recently proposed by Paganini
(1996). After that, I consider a modified minimax problem.
A researcher decides that a sequence might be a realization of white noise process if
she cannot reject the corresponding statistical hypothesis. It is, therefore, quite natural to
assume that a sequence is close to the realization of a white noise process if it belongs to
the set complementary to the rejection region of a test.
One of the tests for the white noise structure of a sequence is the Bartlett cumulative
periodogram test. It consists of accumulating the periodogram of the sequence and com-
paring the result to a linear function. Let E| be a sequence of length . Denote by T E&







Then the periodogram of E| is defined by r￿E&'mT E&m
2 c&'f cc  I will call a
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The actual realizations of the white noise process belong to the set with asymptotic proba-
bility 1. More precisely, the following proposition is true.
8
H See Paganini (1996), Theorem 4.8, p.58.22 .4 Optimal minimax rules
Proposition 2. Let EfcEccE cbe i.i.d., zero mean, Gaussian random vari-
ables. If w￿
s
 $4when  $4 c then
hEEEfccE   5 `￿w $ 
Now let E| be an infinite square summable sequence of n-dimensional vectors. Let
r￿E/ be the spectral density of E| Denote by nn
2
2 the sum of squared components of





2 c where the norm in the right hand side is simply a
length of an n-dimensional vector. Denote by U? an n-dimensional identity matrix. Finally,
for any matrix c denote nn" '4 @   ￿c￿ m￿￿m
As in the finite-horizon, one-dimensional case, I call the infinite sequence E| white



























Let us view a model, {Ec controlled by a policy rule, c as an operator trans-
forming the 2-dimensional sequence of shocks,  ' iE0|c# |￿j
9c to the sequence of 3-
dimensional vectors of target variables, 5 '
q




 Formally, we can
represent this transformation by equation 5 ' {E
Let us define a ‘‘norm’’ of the model, {Ec presented as an operator from the set,
` 2














The following proposition is true.
10
b In the following, I assume that the shocks are scaled so that their variance-covariance matrix is
unity.







w is non-decreasing with respect to w Therefore, proposition 3 im-
plies that if tT{M( n{En
2
‘2











The last observation together with proposition 3 suggests that a good policy rule would






Thereis one more modificationtothe minimaxproblem thatI needtointroduce. This
concerns the nature of the set of perturbations (L e tu sc o n s i d e ras e to fl i n e a rs l o w l yt i m e
varying perturbations to the nominal model f G
(oD ' i{'_@}i{￿￿*B￿￿j G{is uATcnu{  {unDcn{n 	o jc
where the norm on the right hand side is the induced norm of a linear time varying (LTV)
operator from the space, ,2c to itself. If D 'f c then the set becomes a familiar set of linear
time invariant perturbations. If D:fc then the set is wider, allowing lag specifications of,
{c to slowly vary in time with the rate of variation measured by D





￿￿ Whether the solution to (.15) differs from that to (.10) depends on the uniformity properties of
convergence in proposition 3. This question is left for future research.24 .4 Optimal minimax rules
The solution to this problem will yield a policy rule that is most robust against arbitrarily
slowly time varying uncertainty. More precisely, let  W be a solution to (.16). Then for
any other policy rule, c there exist a D:f and a w:fc such that the maximum over
{ 5 (oD of the norm of {E is larger than that of the norm of {E W In other words,
themaximumriskover arbitrarilyclose towhite noisesequencesandarbitrarilyslowlytime
varying perturbations of size less than o is higher for rule, c than for rule,  W
I found solution to problem (.16) by computing oE as outlined in Paganini (1996),
Proposition 6.2. Below I analyze the solution obtained. Figures 6 and 7 show ?uD:f oE
for policy rules of the Taylor-type for o 'f D and  respectively. The expression was
calculated for all rules with }Z 5 d2Dc.2Do (grid of 0.25), and }+ 5 df2DceDo (grid of
0.125). The star, square, and circle points in the pictures correspond to the Taylor rule, the
optimal certainty rule, and the optimal M" rule respectively. The isolines are marked by
the corresponding levels of the worst possible risk.
For o 'f Dc the optimal minimax rule is }Z '2 Hc} + '2  The corresponding
worst possible risk is just below 21. The optimal rule is not far from the certainty rule,
}Z '2 .c} + ' S The worst possible risk for the certainty rule is somewhere between 21
and 25. For comparison, the nominal model risk for the rule is just above 11. The Taylor
rule and the optimal M" rule have approximately equal worst possible risks, about 50. If
there were no uncertainty about Rudebusch and Svensson’s model, the risk for the Taylor
rule would be about 17; that for the optimal M" rule would be about 19.
When o doubles, (see figure 7) the optimal minimax rule becomes more responsive
to the output gap, }+ '2 c and less responsive to inflation, }Z '2  The worst possible.5 Conclusion 25
risk more than doubles for the optimal rule, becoming equal to 50. The Taylor rule and
especially the M" rule become absolutely unacceptable, whereas the worst possible risk
for the certainty rule is somewhere about 100.
The worst possible risk for the optimal minimax rule rises quickly with the size of
perturbations, o For example, for o ' 2Dc the optimal rule is }Z '2 c} + '2  The
associated worst possible risk is 102.
Many questions areleft for futureresearch. One of them is howwell solution to prob-
lem (.16) approximates that to original problem (.10). Another one is how to find the worst
possible perturbations. The analysis of the previous section does not apply to the present
situation because here we analyze robust performance and not simply robust stability prob-
lem. It would also be interesting to analyze robustness with respect to perturbations other
than linear slowly time varying ones.
.5 Conclusion
This paper describes three different exercises concerning the minimax analysis of policy
rules under model uncertainty. First, the minimax approach is compared with the Bayesian
one in simple Brainard’s (1967) setting. Strong similarities between recommendations of
the two approaches are found. Similar to the Bayesian rules, the optimal minimax rules
become less aggressive when uncertainty about the policy multiplier rises. However, in
contrasttotheBayesiancase,thereexisttworegimesoftheoptimalminimaxrule’sreaction
to the amount of uncertainty. When the uncertainty is small the rule stays equal to the26 .5 Conclusion
certainty equivalence rule. The minimax policy becomes more and more passive only after
the sign of the policy effect on the target becomes uncertain.
In the second exercise I analyze the worst possible deviations from Rudebusch and
Svensson’s model. The perturbed models differ from the nominal one in that arbitrarily
more lags of inflation, the output gap, and the real interest rate are added to the Phillips
curve and the aggregate demand equations, and coefficients on the existent lags may be
different. I find the smallest perturbations from the described class that destabilize the
economy for different Taylor-type policy rules. I show that these perturbations have an
exponentially decaying lag structure, characterize the rates of decay and compute impulse-
response functions for the worst possible economies for two representative rules.
The worst possible cases for aggressive rules manifest themselves in frequent and
ever increasing business cycles. These worst possible cases could be characterized by a
relatively high contemporaneous sensitivity of the economy to inflation and the output gap
and the reaction of the output gap to the real interest rate that is more spread-out through
time. The aggressive rules were previously shown to be robust against the structure of the
noise process and parametric uncertainty. The analysis performed in this paper suggests
that these rules are not robust to the model’s lag structure uncertainty.
Finally, the paper finds optimal minimax policy rules for arbitrarily slowly time vary-
ing uncertainty. The optimal rules turn out to be less responsive to inflation and more
responsive to the output gap than the optimal certainty rule..6 Literature 27
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